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Viewing file: accopt.html (9.43 KB) -rw-r--r-- Select action/file-type: (+) | (+) | (+) | Code (+) | Session (+) | (+) | SDB (+) | (+) | (+) | (+) | (+) | (+) | Access Control Optionsfrom Pogo, Walt KellyThe skunk watches for intruders and sprays. Last update: Related LinksTable of ContentsAccess Control SupportThe ntpd daemon implements a general purpose address/mask based restriction list. The list contains address/match entries sorted first by increasing address values and and then by increasing mask values. A match occurs when the bitwise AND of the mask and the packet source address is equal to the bitwise AND of the mask and address in the list. The list is searched in order with the last match found defining the restriction flags associated with the entry. Additional information and examples can be found in the Notes on Configuring NTP and Setting up a NTP Subnet page.The restriction facility was implemented in conformance with the access policies for the original NSFnet backbone time servers. Later the facility was expanded to deflect cryptographic and clogging attacks. While this facility may be useful for keeping unwanted or broken or malicious clients from congesting innocent servers, it should not be considered an alternative to the NTP authentication facilities. Source address based restrictions are easily circumvented by a determined cracker. Clients can be denied service because they are explicitly included in the restrict list created by the restrict command or implicitly as the result of cryptographic or rate limit violations. Cryptographic violations include certificate or identity verification failure; rate limit violations generally result from defective NTP implementations that send packets at abusive rates. Some violations cause denied service only for the offending packet, others cause denied service for a timed period and others cause the denied service for an indefinate period. When a client or network is denied access for an indefinate period, the only way at present to remove the restrictions is by restarting the server. The Kiss-of-Death PacketOrdinarily, packets denied service are simply dropped with no further action except incrementing statistics counters. Sometimes a more proactive response is needed, such as a server message that explicitly requests the client to stop sending and leave a message for the system operator. A special packet format has been created for this purpose called the "kiss-o'-death" (KoD) packet. KoD packets have the leap bits set unsynchronized and stratum set to zero and the reference identifier field set to a four-byte ASCII code. If the noserve or notrust flag of the matching restrict list entry is set, the code is "DENY"; if the limited flag is set and the rate limit is exceeded, the code is "RATE". Finally, if a cryptographic violation occurs, the code is "CRYP". A client receiving a KoD performs a set of sanity checks to minimize security exposure, then updates the stratum and reference identifier peer variables, sets the access denied (TEST4) bit in the peer flash variable and sends a message to the log. As long as the TEST4 bit is set, the client will send no further packets to the server. The only way at present to recover from this condition is to restart the protocol at both the client and server. This happens automatically at the client when the association times out. It will happen at the server only if the server operator cooperates. Access Control Commands
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:: Command execute :: | |
:: Shadow's tricks :D :: | |
Useful Commands
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:: Preddy's tricks :D :: | |
Php Safe-Mode Bypass (Read Files)
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